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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Dana Lydell Smith appeals from the district court's summary dismissal of his
untimely successive petition for post-conviction relief.

On appeal, he argues that the

district court and Idaho Supreme Court denied him access to the courts by denying his
motions for appointed counsel.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The background of this case, as related by the district court, is as follows:
The Petitioner Dana Lydell Smith (hereafter "Mr. Smith") was
convicted of Grand Theft in Minidoka County case CR-2004-2628. The
court sentenced Mr. Smith to a unified term of confinement of fourteen
years with seven years determinate. Mr. Smith appealed. The Idaho
Court of Appeals affirmed Mr. Smith's judgment of conviction in an
unpublished opinion filed May 20, 2009. The remittitur was issued on
June 24, 2009.
On October 31, 2008, Mr. Smith filed a Petition for Post-Conviction
Relief in Minidoka County case CV-2008-892, which was summarily
dismissed on May 7, 2010. Mr. Smith appealed. The Idaho Court of
Appeals affirmed the dismissal of Mr. Smith's original post-conviction
Petition in an unpublished opinion filed November 14, 2011.
(R., pp.162-63.)
On February 18, 2011, Smith filed a successive petition for post-conviction relief,
in which he also requested appointed counsel. (R., pp.1-46.) The district court denied
his request for appointed counsel, noting that Smith's successive petition was untimely
and therefore frivolous. (R., pp.118-23.) Smith filed a motion to clarify (R., pp.125-49),
which the district court denied (R., pp.151-54).
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On November 21, 2012, the district court announced its intent to dismiss Smith's
petition for post-conviction relief on the basis that is was untimely. (R., pp.156-60.) On
January 3, 2012, the district court entered an order and a judgment dismissing Smith's
petition for post-conviction relief.

(R., pp.162-65.)

Smith filed a motion to alter or

amend judgment and a motion for appointed counsel.

(R., pp.167-92.)

The district

court denied both motions. (R., pp.197-200.) Smith filed a notice of appeal timely from
both the judgment of dismissal and the district court's order denying his motion to alter
or amend judgment. (R., pp.202-08.)
With his notice of appeal, Smith requested the appointment of appellate counsel
(R., p.209), which the district court granted (R., p.210). However, after a review of the
record, appointed counsel concluded that she could not "represent Mr. Smith and
comply with IAR 11.2," and so moved to withdraw and allow Smith to proceed pro se.
("Motion To Withdraw As Counsel Of Record And To Allow Appellant To Proceed Pro
Se" and the affidavit in support thereof, filed October 5, 2012 (hereinafter "Motion To
Withdraw").) The Idaho Supreme Court granted the motion. ("Order Granting Motion
To Withdraw As Counsel And Allow Appellant To Proceed Pro Se," filed October 23,
2012 (hereinafter "Order").)
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ISSUES
Smith states the issues on appeal as:
1.
Did the district court and the Idaho Supreme [sic] when it failed to
appoint counsel after appellant advised them that there was no law library
at the prison.
2.
Did the district court err when it dismissed the appellant's petition
for post-conviction as being untimely?
3.
Did the district court err in not ordering a psychiatric evaluation sua
sponte before its dismissal of the petition for post-conviction and the
motion for the appointment of counsel?
(Appellant's brief, p.4.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Has Smith failed to establish that the Idaho Supreme Court and the district court
violated his constitutional rights by denying his motions for appointed counsel?
2.
Has Smith failed to show error in the district court's dismissal of his untimely
successive petition for post-conviction relief?
3.
Has Smith failed to show that the district court was required to, sua sponte, order
a psychiatric evaluation before dismissing his untimely successive petition for postconviction relief?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Smith Has Failed To Establish A Violation Of His Constitutional Rights
A.

Introduction
Below, Smith requested appointed counsel for his successive petition for post-

conviction relief. (R., p.11.) The district court, finding that Smith's claims were timebarred and therefore frivolous, denied the request.

(R., pp.118-23.)

Ultimately, the

district court dismissed Smith's untimely successive post-conviction petition (R., pp.16265) and Smith appealed (R., pp.202-08). Smith requested appointed appellate counsel
(R., p.209), which the district court granted (R., p.210). However, after reviewing the

record and determining that Smith's claims were frivolous, appointed counsel concluded
that she could not "represent Mr. Smith and comply with IAR 11.2," and moved to
withdraw.

(Motion To Withdraw).

The Idaho Supreme Court granted the motion to

withdraw. (Order.)
On appeal, Smith "asserts that the district court and the Idaho Supreme Court
violated his right to access to the courts, and the due process clause, by its denial of the
appointment of counsel." (Appellant's brief, pp.5-11.) Smith has failed to establish a
violation of any of his constitutional rights.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues is one of

deference to factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous, but free review of
whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the facts found. State
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v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 380, 79 P.3d 734, 739 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Smith, 135
Idaho 712, 720, 23 P.3d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001).

C.

The Idaho Supreme Court Did Not Violate Smith's Constitutional Rights By
Allowing His Appellate Counsel To Withdraw
Smith asserts that the Idaho Supreme Court denied him access to the courts by

denying the appointment of appellate counsel.

(Appellant's brief, p.5.)

Smith had

appointed counsel for this appeal. However, appointed counsel determined that all of
Smith's claims were frivolous and moved to withdraw.

(Motion To Withdraw).

The

Idaho Supreme Court granted the motion. (Order.)

1.

If This Case Is Assigned To The Idaho Court of Appeals, Smith Has Failed
To Provide Any Basis For The Court To Reconsider The Idaho Supreme
Court's Order Denying His Motion For Appointed Counsel

In State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618, _ , 288 P.3d 835 (Ct. App. 2012), the Idaho
Court of Appeals considered a claim that the Idaho Supreme Court denied the appellant
his constitutional rights by denying a motion made prior to assignment of the case. In
doing so, the Court "disclaim[ed] any authority to review, and, in effect, reverse an Idaho
Supreme Court decision made on a motion made prior to assignment of the case to [the
Idaho Court of Appeals] on the ground that the Supreme Court decision was contrary to
the state or federal constitutions or other law."

kl

at_, 288 P.3d at 837. Such an

undertaking, the Court explained, "would be tantamount to the Court of Appeals
entertaining an 'appeal' from an Idaho Supreme Court decision and is plainly beyond
the purview of this Court."

kl

In the event that this case is assigned to the Court of
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Appeals, Smith's arguments fail to provide any basis for the Court to reconsider the
Idaho Supreme Court's order allowing appellate counsel to withdraw.

2.

On The Merits. Smith Has Failed To Show Any Constitutional Entitlement
To Counsel On This Appeal

Even if this Court considers the merits of Smith's claim, his assertion still fails.
There is no constitutional right to appointed counsel in post-conviction proceedings,
whether in the trial court or on appeal. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555
(1987) (the right to counsel extends only to criminal trial proceedings, the defendant's
"first appeal as of right, and no further"). The Idaho Supreme Court, therefore, did not
violate Smith's constitutional rights by allowing his appellate counsel to withdraw.

D.

The District Court Did Not Violate Smith's Constitutional Rights By Denying His
Request For Appointed Counsel For His Post-Conviction Petition
Smith asserts that the district court violated his constitutional rights by denying

the appointment of counsel on his post-conviction petition. (Appellant's brief, p.5.) As
noted above, there is no constitutional right to appointed counsel in post-conviction
proceedings. Finley, 481 U.S. at 555 (the right to counsel extends only to criminal trial
proceedings, the defendant's "first appeal as of right, and no further"). Idaho Code §
19-4904, however, allows courts to appoint post-conviction counsel. The decision of
whether or not to appoint counsel in post-conviction cases lies within the discretion of
the district court.

Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111

(2004). A district court may deny a request for appointment of post-conviction counsel
when the claims raised in the petition for post-conviction relief are frivolous. Judd v.
State, 148 Idaho 22, 24, 218 P.3d 1, 3 (Ct. App. 2009). Post-conviction claims that are
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time-barred are frivolous. Hurst v. State, 147 Idaho 682, 686, 214 P.3d 668, 672 (Ct.
App. 2009).
Concluding that Smith's successive petition for post-conviction relief was
untimely and therefore frivolous, the district court, in a proper exercise of its discretion,
denied Smith's request for appointed counsel. (R., pp.118-23.) The state adopts as its
argument on appeal the district court's reasoning for its denial, as set forth at pages 4-6
of its "Order Denying The Petitioner's Request For Appointment Of Counsel," attached
hereto as Appendix A, and at pages 2-4 of its "Order Denying The Petitioner's Motion
To Clarify," attached hereto as Appendix 8.

E.

Smith Has Failed To Show That He Was Denied Access To The Courts
Smith asserts that he was denied access to the courts both below and on appeal

because, he claims, the prison's law library is inadequate. (Appellant's brief, pp.5-11.)
"To demonstrate the denial of meaningful access to the courts, an inmate must show
that shortcomings in the prison legal program prevented his effort to pursue a claim.
The Constitution requires only that inmates be given a reasonably adequate opportunity
to present to the courts their nonfrivolous legal claims relating to their convictions,
sentences, and conditions of confinement." State v. Ochieng, 147 Idaho 621, 626, 213
P.3d 406, 411 (Ct. App. 2009) (citing Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351-53 (1996)).
Smith claims that the prison's law library is inadequate, but has failed to show that any
alleged shortcoming prevented him from pursuing his legal claims, either below or on
appeal. Indeed, he was able to research and cite cases and statutes, and adequately
presented and discussed legal concepts such as equitable tolling and the relation back
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doctrine. (See, .ML., Appellant's brief, pp.5-21; R., pp.126-49.) Smith, therefore, has
failed to demonstrate that he was denied access to the courts.

II.
Smith Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Dismissal Of His Untimely
Successive Petition For Post-Conviction Relief
A.

Introduction
Smith was originally convicted of Grand Theft and appealed. (R., p.162.) His

conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal and remittitur entered on June 24,
2009. (Id.) On October 31, 2008, Smith filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief,
which was summarily dismissed on May 7, 2010. (Id.) Smith appealed, and the Idaho
Court of Appeals affirmed on November 14, 2011. (R., pp.162-63.) On February 18,
2011, Smith filed a successive petition for post-conviction relief.

(R., pp.1-46.) The

district court summarily dismissed the successive petition on the basis that it was
untimely. (R., pp.162-65.)
On appeal, Smith asserts that the district court erred by summarily dismissing his
successive petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that it was timely filed from the
denial of his initial post-conviction, that the time limits should be equitably tolled, or that
his successive petition should relate back to his timely filed initial petition due to alleged
ineffectiveness of post-conviction counsel. (Appellant's brief, pp.11-22.) Application of
the correct legal standards to the facts alleged by Smith shows no error in the district
court's dismissal of his untimely successive post-conviction petition.
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B.

Standard Of Review
"On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an

evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists
based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file
.... " Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 (2007) (citing GilpinGrubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 80, 57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002)).

C.

The District Court Correctly Dismissed Smith's Untimely Successive Petition For
Post-Conviction Relief
Post-conviction proceedings are governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction

Procedure Act. I.C. § 19-4901, et seq. To be timely, a post-conviction proceeding must
be commenced by filing a petition "any time within one (1) year from the expiration of
the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or from the determination of
proceedings following an appeal, whichever is later." I.C. § 19-4902(a). Under Idaho
Code § 19-4906, a district court may summarily dismiss a petition for post-conviction
relief when it "is satisfied, on the basis of the application, the answer or motion, and the
record, that the applicant is not entitled to post-conviction relief," by indicating its
intention to dismiss and giving the parties an opportunity to respond within 20 days. I.C.
§ 19-4906(b); see also Workman, 144 Idaho at 523, 164 P.3d at 803.

Adhering to the requirements set forth in Idaho Code § 19-4906(b), the district
court summarily dismissed Smith's successive petition on the ground that it was
untimely.

(R., pp.162-65.)

In his underlying criminal case, Smith was convicted of

Grand Theft and appealed. (R., p.162.) In an unpublished opinion, the Idaho Court of
Appeals affirmed Smith's conviction, with remittitur entering on June 24, 2009.
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(Id.)

Smith filed his successive post-conviction petition on February 18, 2011 (R., p.1), more
than a year after his judgment became final on appeal. Smith's successive petition for
post-conviction relief was therefore untimely under Idaho Code § 19-4902.
Smith argues that the time limits for filing his petition should be subject to
equitable tolling. (Appellant's brief, p.13.) In the case of successive petitions, the Idaho
Supreme Court has "recognized that rigid application of I.C. § 19-4902 would preclude
courts from considering 'claims which simply are not known to the defendant within the
time limit, yet raise important due process issues."' Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247,
250, 220 P.3d 1066, 1069 (2009) (quoting Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 904,
174 P.3d 870, 874 (2007)).

Idaho appellate courts, therefore, have allowed for

equitable tolling in circumstances where the petitioner is incarcerated in an out-of-state
facility without access to representation or Idaho legal materials, where his mental
illness or medications render him incompetent and prevent him from pursuing a timely
challenge to his conviction, or where the petitioner's claim is based on newly discovered
evidence.

Judd v. State, 148 Idaho 22, 25-26, 218 P.3d 1, 4-5 (Ct. App. 2009).

However, absent a showing by the petitioner that the limitations period should be tolled,
any petition filed outside the one-year limitation period of Idaho Code § 19-4902 is timebarred and subject to summary dismissal. Evensiosky v. State, 136 Idaho 189, 190-91,
30 P.3d 967, 968-69 (2001); Schultz v. State, 151 Idaho 383, 385, 256 P.3d 791, 793
(Ct. App. 2011).
Smith failed to show that the limitations period on his post-conviction proceedings
should have been equitably tolled. As noted by the district court, Smith has not argued
that he was incarcerated out-of-state without legal representation or access to Idaho
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legal materials, or that his claims are based on newly discovered evidence. (See R.,
pp.1-46, 158.) While Smith did note that he has a mental illness and has been on
psychotropic medications (R., pp.140-46, 149), he failed to show that his illness or
medications rendered him incompetent or prevented him from timely filing his
successive petition (R., p.158). Smith's petition, therefore, is not due equitable tolling,
and the district court correctly dismissed it for being untimely.
Smith argues that his untimely successive petition for post-conviction relief
should relate back to his timely-filed petition, because, he alleges, his attorney was
ineffective.

(Appellant's brief, pp.12-22.)

Where a petitioner's initial post-conviction

petition is summarily dismissed due to ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel,
use of the relation-back doctrine may be appropriate. Schwartz v. State, 145 Idaho 186,
189, 177 P.3d 400, 403 (Ct. App. 2008). However, to show ineffective assistance of
counsel, Smith was required to show that his attorney's performance was deficient and
that he was prejudiced by that deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 68788 (1984). To establish a deficiency, Smith was required to show that his attorney's
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.

Aragon v. State,

114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988). To establish prejudice, Smith was
required to show that, but for his attorney's deficient performance, his petition would not
have been summarily dismissed.

&

at 761,760 P.2d at 1177. Smith failed to show

that his post-conviction counsel was ineffective.
On appeal, Smith alleges that his post-conviction counsel was deficient in that he
failed to secure expert testimony and other evidence for impeachment purposes.
(Appellant's brief, pp.16-22.)

However, "[c]ounsel's choice of witnesses, manner of
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cross-examination, and lack of objection to testimony fall within the area of tactical, or
strategic, decisions." Giles v. State, 125 Idaho 921, 924, 877 P.2d 365, 368 (Ct. App.
1994). The Court will not second guess the tactical or strategic decisions of counsel
unless they are based on an objective shortcoming. Howard v. State, 126 Idaho 231,
233, 880 P.2d 261, 263 (Ct. App. 1994).

Smith failed to show that his counsel's

perf~rmance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Smith also failed to
show that his counsel's allegedly deficient performance in not obtaining the specific
testimony caused the dismissal of his initial petition. Smith therefore failed to show that
his counsel was ineffective.
Because Smith failed to show that his initial petition was summarily dismissed
due to ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel, he has failed to show that the
relation-back doctrine applies to his successive petition. Smith's successive petition is
therefore untimely and the district court correctly dismissed it. 1

1

Even had Smith established ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel, his
successive petition would still be untimely. Even where successive post-conviction
claims are not subject to the strict time limits of Idaho Code § 19-4902, they still must be
brought within a reasonable time under Idaho Code § 19-4908. See Rhoades, 148
Idaho at 250-51, 220 P.3d at 1069-70. Smith alleges that his initial post-conviction
petition was dismissed due to ineffective assistance of counsel. (Appellant's brief,
pp.13-22.) Smith's petition was dismissed in May, 2010. (R., p.162.) Smith did not
bring his successive petition until February, 2011. (R., pp.1-46.) Claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel, however, should be known immediately. Rhoades, 148 Idaho at
252, 220 P.3d at 1071. Nine months is therefore not a reasonable time to bring a
successive post-conviction petition on the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
12

111.
Smith Has Failed To Show That The District Court Was Required To, Sua Sponte,
Order A Psychological Evaluation Before Dismissing His Untimely Successive Petition
For Post-Conviction Relief
"Error is never presumed on appeal and the burden of showing it is on the party
alleging it." Stewart v. Sun Valley Co., 140 Idaho 381, 384, 94 P.3d 686, 689 (2004)
(quotations omitted); Farrell v. Board of Com'rs, Lemhi County, 138 Idaho 378, 390, 64
P.3d 304, 316 (2002) (appellant carries burden of showing error on record and error
never presumed); State v. Mowrey, 128 Idaho 804, 805, 919 P.2d 333, 334 (1996)
(appellant has burden of showing error in record). On appeal, Smith raises as an issue
whether the district court erred by not ordering a psychological evaluation sua sponte
before denying his motion for appointed counsel and dismissing his petition for postconviction relief. (Appellant's brief, p.4.) However, nowhere on appeal has Smith made
any argument that he was entitled to an evaluation or that the district court erred by not
ordering the evaluation. (See generally Appellant's brief.) The most Smith offers is a
sentence in his "Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings" that "the failure to
order a psychiatric evaluation before dismissal of the post-conviction substantiates, the
abuse of discretion of the courts or whomever should have ordered this to check the
mental status of the Appellant and his ability to proceed without assistance."
(Appellant's brief, p.2.) Having failed to provide any argument that the district court was
required to, sua sponte, order a psychological evaluation before dismissing Smith's
successive post-conviction petition and denying his request for counsel, Smith has
waived this issue and it should not be considered on appeal. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho
259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996).
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Even had Smith presented some argument that the district court erred by not
ordering a psychological evaluation before dismissing his petition for post-conviction
relief and denying his request for counsel, that argument would still fail. Idaho statutory
law requires a trial court to order a psychological evaluation in criminal cases when
there is a genuine reason to doubt the defendant's competence to assist in his own
defense or understand the proceedings. I. C. §§ 18-210 and 18-211. However, there is
no corresponding requirement in civil cases. A petition for post-conviction relief initiates
a new and independent civil proceeding. Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 522, 164
P.3d 798, 802 (2007); State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550
(1983).

Because there is no entitlement to a psychological evaluation in a civil

proceeding, the district court did not err by failing to, sua sponte, order the evaluation.

CONCLUSION

The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's order
summarily dismissing Smith's untimely successive petition for post-conviction relief.

DATED this 26th day of February, 2013.

c~

RUSSELLJ.SPENCER
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 26th day of February, 2013, I caused two true
and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed in the
United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
DANA LYDELL SMITH
IDOC #87854
IMSI A-Block
PO Box 51
Boise, ID 83707

~
Deputy Attorney General

RJS/pm
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appeal:

(]) be WIii denied Ida ripl to coumel al I pe-trlat lmmp;
(2) be received Jnaffidive aeist,nm of couwl .a trial because his attmmy.

(a) failed

to in:veatipte the facts ofthe cue and potential dcfemes,

(b) failed to adequatel7 prepare for trial:

(cl) fidled

tom.•'* modom prim to aad durlna trial;

(f) failed to request I specific jury imCruction;

(3) the court admitted prejudicial hcaray that the defense could not effectively cross-

(5) the prosecution filled to collect or pnserve eviclmce favorable to Mr. Smith;

(6) the plOIICldion failed

to

dtsclole the identity of an informant wbo actively

participated in ad wu a wi1nlll to the crime;
(7) the court made emn that denied Mr. Smida a fair 1rial;
(I) be WII dmiecl diaccmry of rm8dendaJ IICOlds that wen, material to the defense;

(9) be WU •lectlvely prosecuted based OD bis race;
(10) the cow1 denied him his rlpt to I speedy trial;
(11) the plOIICldion lmowinpy used. or tiUed to com,ct, pmjured tesdmony;
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(12) he

wu convicted II a result of a police interrogation conduetecl without counsel

piesenl after he ~ counsel in the context of a separate investigation;

(13) bis confession was oblainccl durina a police iutanoptioa in wbfch hi was denied the

ript to have counsel pmcnl; and

(14) the Idaho Department of Correction denied him his right to an adequate law library
and lepl assistanco.
Mr. Smith makes the followina arguments regardlna the underlyina criminal case durina
i

the appeal phase of the pmceedJnp:

(2) be RCOivcd inefToctlve assistance of counso1 on appeal because bu attomr:y failed to

raise the foJlowina is.,ues OD appeal:
(a) Joshua Johnston's petjm, and 1be prosecution•s inducement for him to testify;
(b) statememl made to tho jury which violated the court's rulina on a motion in

Umlne;

(c) proper jurildfction of the cour11 in Utah and in Idaho to IUle on evidence and
for law enfon:rmcmt to ini1fate aa invesdption;
(d) Joshua Johnston's crim1m1 hisrmy, mmdll health ml1uadon, and prior

drua

test while OD probation;
(e) failure to secure additional medical records by counsel and expert witnesses to

substantiate Mr. Smith's position that there was Insufficient m,na rea to support
the criminal charges;
(f) inconsisten.cia In statemeDtl by law enfon::ement, the prosecutor, and

proaecutioD witnesses wbich should have belll suppressed or excluded; .

ORDER DENYING TifE PETlTIONER'S UQUEST FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
cv-2011-24'

120

-·-

,
{s) whether the couns in Utah and Idaho were advised of evidendary issues;
(h) whether the actions of Dan Price and Dennis James corrupted the testimony of

Joshua E. Johnson, due to their intmacdoD with him la Utab; and
(I) whether Mr. Smith's dpt to a speedy trial had bem vlolmd.

After

settina forth

all of his claims, Mr. Smith lnduded in his Petition a request to

proceed in fonna pauperis and a request for appointment of counsel. He dicl not make these
requests by separately filed motions, nor did he pro'Yide a supporting affidavit. Upon discoverina

Mr. Smith's reqlllllt fbr appoi111ment for counsel, tbo court toot 1he matter under adYisement.
DISCUSSION
Idaho Code § 19-4904 provides that a post-conviction petitioner may have court•
appointed coumel. The decision to grant or deny a request for court-appointed eounse1 in a postconviction case lies within the discretion of the district court. Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho
789, 792, 102 P.Jd 11 OS. 1111 (2004). Tho court perceives the issue as a matter of discretion and
exercises that discretion within the bounds provided by the following legal authority.
A trial court should appoint counsel in a post-conviction case "if facts are allepcl givlna

rise to the poulbUlty of a valid claim." Judd v. State, 148 Idabo 22, 24, 211 P.3d 1, 3 (Ct App.
2009). A coult may only deny a request for appointed counsel if all the claims In the petition are
£rivolous. Id. A post-conviction claim that is time-barred is tiivolous. HU8I "· State, 147 Idaho
682, 686, 214 P.Jd 668, 672 (Ct App. 2009).

A post-conviction petidoa Mmay be tiled at any time within one (1) year &om the

expiration of the time for appeal or tom the determinsdon of an appeal or from the
determination of a pn,ceedin1 followina an appeal, wbicheYer is latar." LC. § 19-4902(a). An
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appeal is considered to be "determined" upon the appellate court's issuance of the rmnitdtur.
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Leer v. Stale, 148 Idaho 112,114,218 P.Jd 1173, 1175 (Ct. App. 2009).

Tbe one-year statute of llmitadona for post-conviction actions may be equitably tolled
under the followfna circumstances: (1) "where the applicant was incarcerated in an out-of-smm
facility without lepl r~tation or access to Idaho legal materfals"; (2) "where mental

disease and/or psychotropic medication nmderccl the applicant incompetent and prevented him
from pursuing earlier challenges to the conviction"; or (3) in limited circumstances, where a
petitioner dflcovorl the ticts glvina rise to the claidl at a later dare. Judd 11. Sia#, 148 Idimo 22,

25-26, 211 P.3d 1, 4-S (Ct. App. 2009).
Tbe Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed Mr. Smith's convictiall in aa unpublisbecl opinioa
filed May 20, 2009. The remittitur was issued on June 17, 2009. Pursuant to LC.§ 1M902(a).
Mr. Smith was required to file his post-conviction petition on or before June 17, 2010}

However. bis filed this Petition on February 18, 2011, approximately eight months aftar the
deadlJne. Tberefbre the claims in Mr. Smith's post-conviction Petition reJatina to the proceed!np
in CR-2004-2628 appear to be time-barred.

It does not appear that Mr. Smith baa offered ·any explanation for the untimely fllhia of
the Petitioa that would equitably toll the statute of Umitatiom. He does not assert that he was
incan:erated in an om-of-state facility without representation or aceess to Idaho legal materials;
be does not assert that he was incompetent due to a mental disease or psychotropic medication

I 1'bl OGll1...,..... tJia afnol dll JdabD Coat of Appeals [1111111 dll remltdtur, Mr, Smida Ml coadallld to flle
pro .. madam Ill CA-2004-2621. lncladlna I Madan ror I Nn Trfll, I Modm fbr I Fonlltl ~ • Mtdon to
·Abs. Amend• Judpw,t' - · Madan for
Redlll:dm ofSea1twe, lCR 35. Howtt•, Mr. Smkb
ba nat rlflldlllJ . . . ....,,. ftaD .... polMpplltl praceedlnp. n..tore, dll 11111111 ofUmi1ldaDI OD tbl
fuua bl ha raiNd bepD to nll GIIICI 1111 ftllldllu Wll fllUld OIi JuDI 17, 2009,

ean-..
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whieh pievented him tiom punuina earlier cbelJenps to the conviction; and he does not assat
thal be discovered the filCtl givina rise to the claims at a later date.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Mr. Smith's clabnl in bis poat-conviction Pedtion appear to be tm.bamld. At tbia point,
Mr. Smith baa failed to show tbaa the statute of llmitadom should be equitably tolled. Since tbl
claims appear to be ftivoloua because they are lllltlmely, Mr. Smith's iequeat f'CJr app,iah1• .of
counsel is denied.

lt is so ORDERED this

"1l" day of Augusa, 2011.

MICHAEL R. CRABTRBB
Discric:C Judp
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HLHh...~,: .... ,.

CASE

;1 ______ _

2011 OCT 31 PH 2: 1+8

PA~L•c=

IN mE DISTRICT COURT OP THE FtFnl JUDICIAL DISTRICT OP
111E STATE OP IDAHO, IN AND FOR nm COUN1Y OP MINJDOICA
DANA LYDELL SMl'IH.

Cue No.CV-2011·246

STATE Of IDAHO,
nefeadant

ORDD DENYING TD t£"Hl10Dll'S MOTION TO CLARDY

PJlOCEDIJRAL IL\CKGll.OlJND

n. Pedifomr Dinirydell Smidi (Jiinafir "Mr: Siidill,-._- coliilcmf o!Oriiid ,w- ·
la MJnJdnka County case CR-2004-2621. Tile court sentmced Mr. Smida to a unified tenn of
C()Dflzwiwna

of lourtceo yeas. witb savcn yara deCllminale. TIii Idaho Co1III of Appeals

aftlnmd Mr. SmJth'1jnd.....- of cometice DI ID uapubllshecl opiaion med May 20, 2009. Mr.

r

Smida &led I Pdloa for Poll-Ccmvicdon Rellcf fa Mlmdab CounlJ c:ase CV•200l-l92, wbicll
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011 Februmy 11. 2011, Mr. Smith fDed a 1UCCC111M Petition far Post-ccmvicdon Jlelief in
cbl praml ca11. Mr. Smldl iDdudal in bll Pmdcm a rcquat f'ar appoinlment of c:ounaa. The
co11t eatlnd

Ill

order

OD

Aupll 30, 201 l dmylna Mr. Smida11 request far appoin..,_,. of

coume1 bec11w bis Pcddaa wa filed

~ of tbo one-year sllllum of limftadolll

far post•

coavictim . . . .

OD Seplwoher 29, 2011, Mr. Smida flied a Motion to Clarify and a suppcudna
Mlmonwdom It IIIIPCIII dlll Mr. Smid1 filed die iDllaDt Madon ID Older to addnlll Iha court's

cam:luam eta be

L

WIii nat

adidcd ID the appoildmml of C01IILW in dUI CIIO boaen• Im

lq....... Tolllaa

The ~year staSute of limitadou for post-conviction rdiaf' may bo equitably tolled
mder dll foDowlq

camn,111...-: (l) ~ 1111 ...,._.. w

flldUtJ witboa& Jepl

iij8t& Mklino m' ICCaa ID

Jdabo Jepl

~ I D • 01ll-okm
~ (2) . . . . .

Dlllal

. . . . llld/m paydlotropil meckldoa rtmdmd tlll applfclnt iDODmpeltlll IDd pmmted Jdm

8am pnulaa .-liar dwlJenpl ID die caavlcdaD"; ar (3) la limflal ~ - I a. wlme a

peddc-• dllmrm 1111 &Im alYina rise ID die clafm It a Jar cl& JwJtl., &at,, 141 ldabo 22,
25-2', 211 P.3d I, 4-5 (Ct. App. 2009).

Mr. Smbla .,,.. to bl arplna that equitable 1Dllina sbould apply IDd bit ......
Petidaa should bf doemed dmely bfclUII hi ba been OD psycbocroplo mecffeatioa slnce 1919.
Mot. ~ 24. Mr. Smida ba not arped or shown 1h11 his peychotlOplc medlcldo.a ba

rendlllld him incomplteat a, pmenmi him &om punuina
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CODYicdoa. JDdeed, Mr. Smi1h ffled I timely pro • post-convicdoa pedtioa in Mhddoka County
C111

CV-2008-892, IIDll mba trequendJ flied motfau ml odler documeDII in dm cua, bis

IID&ferfJlna crlmfaaJ CW. and fn tm present case. 'J'bcn is DO t.fs for the court to rmc1ude that
Mr. SmJdl'1 plJCbD1mplo mdcadoaa prevealld him hm chaPenafna bil CODVictlon in I timely

w . Tbac£:n, Mr. Smith baa failed to show tlllt equitable tollfna sllauld apply iD dda c:1111.

A paidons 'UY fDI I succcmive post-cmmcdon pdttioa outside ofdle om-year-..,
of lhnftwdrm . . roJmi -* to the dmely cx,mt

ftndl

I

p,und ftJr reUaf lllllfllll whlcll fbr sufBc:lenl laal

hlldequmlJ ndled la 1111

.W.W.

1.

of the fnidll post-cmmcdan peddoD if "tbl

~

WII DOI

111111111d •

,upplnnea1ta1. at amended applicalkm.• LC.

WIii

f IM90I;

SW., 14J Idabo 116, 189, l'n P.lcl 400. 403 (CL App. 2008). lftbe petitlans'1

'1nldll aw)lcadoa w 111mnmity cllPDimd a to the aUcpl inetfec:tlvmas of the initial post·
COIMOtioa ODIIDlel, 1111 of thl relation-back ducbiml may be appropdare." Sclrwaru, 145 ldabo

• 119, l'nPJdd403.

la die Modem 1D ~ . Mr. Smfdl appclll to be aqpdna dllt the reladae-ba doalliDI
UDUld apply la tlda C110 '*'1• hfa COIIDSIII In the lnitlal post-caaYfcdcm Jll1I eecflna, mnill

.

Bina (bereaftlr-Mr. BlawD"). W11 inefftcdve. ID hfa Memmudum. Mr. Smith pnmdlll 1111

followlJII .......... reprdlaa hit initial post-coamctiaa cm: (1) Mr. BJOWD sbould haw brm
awue ofdll ..... ralll of pleedina m. civil cw. punum to LR.C.P. I; (2) Mr. Bmwn ftiled
to alt wida him; (3) Mr. 8nm buna up tbl tllepbam CII Mr. Smitb OD lfflnl 000,si,'!lli (4)

Mr. Smida WII na1 pamiUld to cmcr I coumuom la April of an unknown year, eYeD wbm m
told dll 1-ilifl 1h11 be wfsbed to fire hll counsel mt proceed wfdl bis cw; and (5) Mr. 11ruwa•1
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